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History in the Hands of the Politicians: Lustration, Civil Society, and Unfinished
Revolutions in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic

The year 1989 held both great hope and disappointment for advocates of civil society.
Only three years previously, people power had been responsible for the ouster the of the Marcos
regime in the Philippines. Intellectuals such as Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron in Poland and
Václav Havel in Czechoslovokia had for at least a decade conceived of a civil society that would
challenge, and perhaps replace the Communists regimes (Kopecky and Barnfield 1999).
Solidarity had survived the 1981 martial law and become a mass movement. Charter 77 in
Czechoslovokia, while heavily repressed by the regime, was still influential. The hopes of many
seemed to be realized in 1989 as the Communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe fell
rapidly that year. Yet the limits of people power were illustrated in a bloody counterpoint in June
of the same year with the violent crackdown in Tiananmen Square. While less dramatic, the
limits of the civil society that had emerged during the last years of the regimes quickly began to
become apparent as those states transitioned to and began to consolidate their democracies.
During the last twenty years, the role that civil society played in the ousting of the
communist regimes has been well-documented (Arato 1992, Kopecky and Barnfield 1999). In
Poland the 1981 crackdown had neutralized the Solidarity movement for a number of years, yet
the regime was unwilling or unable to use a strategy of repression indefinitely. By 1989 mass
strikes and popular mobilization organized by Solidarity, coupled with a severe economic crisis
brought the regime to a breaking point. With the threat of Soviet intervention unlikely, it began
to negotiate directly with Solidarity in what came to be known as the Roundtable Agreements,
intending to gain support for economic reforms from Western countries as well as from
Solidarity (Elster 1996). As part of the agreement, the communist regime allowed semi-free
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elections in which 35% of the seats in the lower house were contested and in the end, greatly
overestimated its popular support, losing all contested seats. After the communist party was
unable to form a coalition government, Solidarity intellectual Tadeusz Mazowiecki became
prime minister.
Similarly, in Hungary, mass demonstrations –to commemorate Imre Nagy’s execution
following the 1956 Revolution and the anniversary of the 1848 revolution -- forced the
government to contemplate negotiations with the opposition, which formed the Opposition
Round Table at the end of March. Negotiations began in April between the government and
opposition groups, and in the wake of semi-free elections in Poland, the regime understood that it
was likely to lose power (Kennedy 2002, Bozóki and Karacsony 2002). Despite the relatively
mild nature of the Hungarian regime, the opposition parties won a commanding position in the
first free elections in 1990 (McFaul 2002). In contrast to the relatively liberal regimes in Poland
and Hungary, Czechoslovakia, one of the most repressive of the communist states, allowed for
little pluralism until the very end of the regime. When the state violently cracked down on a
protest on November 17, the Czech opposition quickly united into the Civic Forum, composed of
many dissident signatories of Charter 77, and the Slovak opposition formed Public Against
Violence. In the 1990 founding elections, the communists were swept from power, winning only
thirteen percent in both houses of parliament, with the opposition joining President Havel in
leading the country away from its communist past (McFaul 2002).
Given the transformative contribution of popular mobilization in the removal of these
communist regimes, one might expect civil society to play a significant role in transitional justice
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policies to redress the wrongs of the past regimes.1 Moreover, in countries such as Guatemala,
Argentina, and South Africa, civic organizations were instrumental in placing pressure on
authorities to investigate crimes and also served as a bridge between elites and local level
activists pushing for reconciliation (Colvin 2007). Yet, paradoxically, civil society seems not to
have played an important role in lustration and file access policies in the post-communist
countries of Central Europe. This creates a puzzle: why was the involvement of civic movements
in these policies minimal in those countries where they played such a crucial role in the
transition?
Alexis de Tocqueville’s (2000) observations linking the vitality of U.S. democracy to its
mobilized civil society were probably the first recognizing the significance of an independently
organized civic sector to democracy. More recently, Robert Putnam’s 1993 book Making
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy revived scholarly interest in understanding
how the activities of civil society promote democratic consolidation. In addition to the
revolutions of 1989, the role “People power” has been studied in democratic transitions in the
Philippines, Serbia, and Ukraine (Shock 1999, McFaul 2005). For this paper I use Diamond’s
(1999: 221) definition of civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is open,
voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and

1

Transitional justice polices can include restitution, vetting of screening of persons in the former authoritarian
regime, access to secret police files, and truth commissions. While many of the post-communist countries had some
form of restitution, vetting and file access were the most common types of policies in the region. File access was a
more salient issue in post-communist transitional justice, as these regimes documented nearly everything, as
contrasted with Latin America and Africa, where regimes tried to hide their human rights abuses. Truth
commissions, although perhaps the most widely-know type of transitional justice policy, were rarely used in the
post-communist countries. (Hayner 2002; Stan 2009)
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bound by a legal order or shared rules;” it serves as “an intermediary phenomenon, standing
between the private sphere and the state” (Diamond 1999: 221).2
In contrast to the democratization literature, much of which has focused on the
contribution of “people power” to the breakdown of communist regime in East Central Europe,
the literature concerning transitional justice has been almost entirely supply-based. Early studies
focused on the type of the former regime and its repressiveness as well as the balance of power
between the regime and the opposition at the time of the transition as explanatory factors for
differences in transitional justice policies (Huntington 1993, Linz and Stepan 1996). Later
studies began to take into account present political conditions such as party competition (Welsh
1996, David 2003). Yet, very little has been written on the demand (or lack thereof) from the
public for such policies. This paper makes an attempt to account for the minimal amount of civic
engagement in lustration and file access polices in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech
Republic. I argue that there are a number of factors, both structural and strategic, that account for
the lack of demand for these policies by civil society. First, I argue that the legacies of the former
regimes are significant because of their destructive effect on civil society. Secondly, the
reorganization of oppositionist groups into political parties and the movement of important
dissidents into government resulted in a fragmentation of civil society and groups’ depletion of
skilled activists and organizational repertoires. Lastly, I argue that lustration laws became a
means of competition among political parties. As ex-communist parties regenerated, rightist
parties attempted to modify or expand the scope of these laws to gain political advantage.

2

A note on terminology; civil society in the way defined in this paper was weak or non-existent during the
communist era, with the exception of Poland. During this time it was conceived of by many dissidents as a parallel
society that by its existence would weaken and perhaps supplant the state. Civil society in Hungary and
Czechoslovakia was comprised of relatively small numbers of elites, contrasted to Poland’s mass movements
(Kopecky and Barnfield 1999).
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In the following sections, I explore the scholarly literature on civil society and lustration
policies in the ECE countries, with attention to the weakness of civil society in the region and the
factors scholars have examined to explain these policies. Next, I outline the factors responsible
for the relative lack of civil society involvement in these polices and the theoretical basis of these
factors. The third section details the methodology used in this research. The fourth section
examines the evidence for these factors, and the concluding section examines possible
implications of this paper for further research on post-communist lustration.
Civil Society in Post-communist Europe
The weakness of civil society in the ECE states has generally been accepted in the
literature (Howard 2003, Barnes 2006), and the most common explanation is structural. Every
state in Eastern Europe was controlled by a communist regime after the Second World War.
While communist regimes in general tend to support less pluralism than conventional
authoritarian regimes such as those in Latin America, there were variations in the tolerance of
pluralism in the ECE region. Hungary and Poland were among the most liberal of the regimes
despite the repressions of the 1950’s and the 1981 declaration of martial law in Poland.
Poland was one of the few states that never fully collectived, and the Catholic Church,
while heavily controlled by the state, was never fully eliminated. Poland had a history of strikes
and protests throughout much of it’s Communist era, though most were suppressed. The late
1970’s saw formation of the KOR dissident group, and the emergence of Solidarity as a major
force. Although the regime’s declaration of martial law in 1981 led to the most severe repression
in a decade in Poland, Solidarity’s numbers continued to grow.
After the Soviet invasion and crackdown in 1956, the regime in Hungary under János
Kádár embraced a policy summed up by the expression “if you aren’t against us, you are with
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us,” and more commonly referred to as “goulash communism.” Hungary allowed some multiparty elections as early as 1985, as well as the existence of opposition groups in the late 80’s
(Stan 2009b).
As a result of the repressive nature of these regimes, the civil society that emerged postrevolution was weak and disorganized. Howard (2003) attributes this frailty to more than simply
the repressive nature of these regimes. He argues that the legacy of mistrust of communist
organizations, which were often the only organizations permitted by the state, has made people
reluctant to join civil organizations in the post-communist era. Additionally, friendship networks,
formed during the communist era to help cope with the economies of shortage and near-complete
control of the public sector by the state, continued to exist after the transition. Based on his
analysis of survey data, Howard finds that those who have maintained their networks tend to be
less involved in civic groups and also that disappointment with the post-communist period and
its economic problems makes a person less inclined to join voluntary associations. Bernhard and
Karakoć (2007) build upon these structural explanations and confirm Howard’s (2003)
conclusions regarding the weakness of civil society in post-communist Europe. They examine
civil society in two dimensions: organization and protest behavior, placed within Linz and
Stepan’s (1996) typology of authoritarian and totalitarian (and post-totalitarian) states. Linz and
Stepan differentiate totalitarian regimes from authoritarian regimes in part because of the latter’s
total suppression of pluralism. Although Linz and Stephan don’t consider Poland to have been
totalitarian, Bernhard and Karakoć code it as totalitarian along with Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Slovakia. They find that a dictatorial regime’s duration has a significant impact on civil
society in both dimensions and that totalitarian regimes have a more negative impact on the
organizational dimension than do other types of authoritarian regimes.
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Lustration in Postcommunist Europe
In post-communist Europe, the most common form of transitional justice was screening
or vetting, which came to be known as “lustration,” after the Greek and Roman ceremony of
purification. Williams et. al (2005, 23) define lustration as “the systematic vetting of public
officials for links to the communist-era security services.” Research on lustration has largely
treated these polices as supply-driven, despite indications that public support for lustration was
consistently strong (Williams, et. al. 2005). Initially, the determinative factors for which polices
were pursued were thought to be structural. Huntington (1993) and Huyse (1995) examine the
nature of the past regime and the mode in which the transition to democracy took place, the
international context at the time of transition, and the balance of power between the regime and
the opposition. Williams et. al. (2005) and Kaminski and Nepala (2008) contend that the
adoption of lustration polices depends mostly on strategic concerns such as type of party leading
the government (right wing or ex-communist), the ability to remove lustration from the context
of transitional justice, present concerns about protecting the current regime, and future policies
after power transfers in the legislature.3 Other authors offer multi-causal arguments that take into
account both structural and strategic factors, including past repression and type of transition as
well as competition between political parties, public concerns about secret police files, and the
continuing influence of the nomenklatura (Welsh 1996). In her recent examination of
transitional justice policies in the post-communist countries, Lavina Stan (2009) also argues that
that the specific lustration laws in a country are the result of three factors: the organization,
strength and composition of the opposition, whether the communist regime used repression or

3

Williams, Fowler, and Szczerbiak phrase their argument in terms of demands for lustration. However they do so in
a slightly different way than I do here, focusing their analysis on political actors.
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co-optation to control society, and the pre-communist experience of pluralism in the country
(268).
Brian Grodsky’s (2007a, 2007b, 2008) work provides an important departure from the
literature in that, while it deals with elite actors, it does so in the context of the voters’
expectations and demands of the masses. In his 2008 article, Grodsky focuses on institutions of
the present and the actors occupying those institutions after the transition.4 Grodsky assumes that
since most former opposition members now in power will want to pursue harsh policies, the
interplay between primary constitutional positions, such as prime ministers and secondary
institutions, such as presidencies in states which have weak presidencies, determines policy
outcomes. Actors in primary positions, find that their personal preferences, and indeed societal
preferences, for transitional justice policies have to be balanced with the public’s demand for
goods and services.
In contrast to the more narrowly defined research on lustration in post-communist
Europe, studies on transitional justice have found that civil society successfully pressured
governments into investigating past human rights abuses in countries such as Argentina, Chile,
Guatemala, South Africa, and Uruguay (Crocker 1999; Backer 2003; Baxter 2005; Colvin 2007).
Elite understandings of and desires for transitional justice often times differ from those of nonelites in these regions, and civic groups have served as a way to reconcile these understandings
and influence policy. Backer (2003) identifies data collection and monitoring, representation and
advocacy, collaboration, facilitation and consultation, service delivery and intervention, parallel
or substitute authority (to state-sponsored transitional justice projects), and research and
education as key ways in which civil society contributes to these policies (Backer 2003: 3024

Grodsky’s analysis concentrates on rights abuses, not polices concerned with lustration or opening of files.
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305). This raises the question as to why there was not a similar role for civic organizations in
post-communist East Central Europe. Backer (2003) examines both supply and demand factors
in his examination of civil society and transitional justice, finding that in post-communist
Europe, the depletion of civil society by government and the lack of truth commissions and
prosecutions, which would lend themselves to involvement by civic groups, led to attenuated
transitional justice polices.
Accounting for the Lack of Civil Society Input in Lustration Policies
As the preceding review illustrates, the supply side emphasis of policy formulation
neglects the demand side of the equation, despite some discussions of public opinion. While
some scholars have written on the involvement of civil society in Latin America and Southern
Africa, research concerning lustration in the postcommunist European states has maintained a
structural and strategic focus, with no comparable examination of the civil society’s contribution,
which had been so critical to the ousting of the communist regimes in 1989.
This research project was launched as an attempt to fill that gap in the literature.
However, the evidence does not show a great deal of civic activity in the lustration legislative
processes of these four countries.5 The current paper evolved as an attempt to solve the puzzle of
such little civic engagement in dealing with the past crimes of the regimes that it had primarily
been organized to oppose.
The first factor to account for the low levels of civil society involvement in lustration
policies are the legacies of the past regime. The Communist regimes attempted to control all
social activity in the state, and with the exception of Poland, succeeded in destroying all
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The exception here is the media. While the privately-owned media is a part of civil society, and played a very
important role in reporting and advocacy in policy debates, I could not properly examine this role due to language
limitations.
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pluralism. As the lustration laws in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the 1995 law in Poland all
occurred with less than a decade of the transition, civil society did not have sufficient time to
regenerate, while levels of involvement seem to have been higher surrounding the 2006 law in
Poland. Slovokia, the last of the four states to pass lustration legislation, had a less negative view
of the Communist regime than did the other states, and there was little interest among elites or
the public in lustration, and consequently little civil society involvement, even a decade later.
Secondly, many of the leaders of civil society prior to 1989 came into power as the
former regimes were ousted. In Poland, the communists lost power to Solidarity after the 1989
semi-free elections and the first free elections in 1991. In Czechoslovakia, Civic Forum and
Public Against Violence came to power in June 1990, after the communist regime collapsed in
the wake the November 1989 demonstrations, while in Hungary, the reformed communist party
lost the first free elections in 1990 to the Hungarian Democratic Forum, an alliance of former
democratic dissidents. Often times these movements became victims of their own success; the
civil societies that were organized in opposition to the state splinted when the focus of opposition
was removed and various interests came into competition. Those that had existed as umbrella
organizations responsible for ousting the communists then eventually fragmented into various
political parties, meaning that many actors and organizations that had an interest in lustration
were no longer part of civil society (Kopecky and Barnfield 1999; Backer 2005).6 Since many of
the former dissident leaders and organizations were now either part of the government or
political parties, this left a dearth of actors or movements in the civil sector to become involved
in the police debates, and fragmentation in Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary meant that those now
in power found themselves on opposite sides of the lustration debates
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Third, lustration and lustration laws became a competitive weapon between parties on the
left and right, especially after the regeneration of ex-communists and their entry into government
after the founding elections (Grzymała-Busse 2002). This was particularly true in Hungary and
Poland, where lustration eventually came to be a weapon against not only the ex-communists,
but also former dissidents (Szczerbiak 2002, David 2003, Williams et. al. 2005). Since lustration
seems to have never been widely popular in Hungary, and enjoyed considerable support in
Poland, where a lustration law was passed years later, this suggests that strategic concerns of
parties played a larger role public desire or advocacy.
While some scholars have investigated the involvement of civil society and transitional
justice in a broad context, and others have looked specifically at this interaction in Latin America
and Southern Africa, no specific study has connected civil society and lustration in the ECE
countries. These four factors outlined above explain why civic organizations’ participation was
lacking in the enactment of lustration policies in these four states.
Methodology
The four cases examined in this paper -- Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech
Republic -- were chosen for this study due to the significant amount of civic involvement in the
ousting of their communist regimes. These four countries are often times studied together to
control for alternative explanations such as demonstration effects due to the geographical
closeness of these countries, comparatively high levels of economic development with high
levels of social capital and similarly swift pursuit of democratization and economic reforms
compared to other post-communist countries. Likewise, those analyzing lustration policies have
adopted a similar strategy of analysis (Williams et. al 2005, Szabo 2007, Apple 2005).
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This analysis covers the period beginning in 1989 until 2007 to account for developments
following the 1989 revolutions and initial debates about lustration and file access, as well as the
last lustration and decommunization laws in Poland. Due to language limitations, my primary
source analysis included broad keyword searches in the daily reports from the Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty archives as well as RFE/RL Research Reports. Additionally, I used the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service’s Eastern European Daily Reports.
Evidence
Legacies of the Regime
The legacies of the past regimes have important consequences for this study along two
dimensions. First as discussed in the literature review, the Communist regimes had very
destructive effects on pluralism. Because the Communist regimes attempted to regulate all
aspects of society, society became atomized and citizens turned inward, forming private
networks (Howard 2003; Kopecky and Barnfield 1999). Kopecky and Barnfield (1999) argue
that only Poland had a robust civil society emerge before democratization. They argue that in
Hungary the process of rebuilding civil society was implanted by the regime in order to have a
negotiating partner, while in Czechoslovakia the dissenting civil society was limited to a
relatively small number of intellectuals.
Kopecky and Barnfield (1999: 83) quote Miszlivetz in describing the “statistically
significant civil society”. In Slovakia, the 1990 total of 3,167 interest groups and 38 trade unions
rose to 11,870 interest groups and 86 trade unions, while in Hungary there were 30,507 NGOs by
1992. The actual nature of these organizations, however, belies the numbers; 70% of the
Slovakian organizations were sporting or garden clubs, while 50% Hungarian NGOs were
sporting groups (Kopecky and Barnfield 1999: 83-84). Kopecky and Barnfield (1999: 84) quote
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Miszlivetz concerning the “artificial nature or pseudo-existence” or many registered NGOs,
which are often directly influenced or created by parties or officials. As Letki (2004) found in
her study of political involvement labor and lifestyle associations are likely to lead to political
involvement.
The lustration laws that were passed in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the 1992 lustration
attempt and the 1995 lustration law in Poland all occurred within a short time frame of the
collapse of the regime, it is therefore reasonable that there should be less civil society
involvement, given it’s general weakness. As the effects of the former regimes dissipate over
time, we should expect more civil society involvement with Poland’s 2006 lustration law. Such
seems to have been the case.7
In addition to the destructive effects on civil society of the Communist regimes, the
perceptions of the past regime were also important. Many theories of lustration policies take
account of the nature of the previous regime. While Poland and Hungary which opted for
strategies of co-optation, Czechoslovakia utilized a strategy of repression (Stan 2009c). Yet
within the Czech and Slovak regions of Czechoslovakia, significant differences existed in regard
to the government. Nedelsky (2004) argues that the 1968 crackdown actually benefited the
Slovak region, as most of the members of the party purged were Czech, and the region was able
to gain more power and resources within the federation. A public opinion poll taken in 2001
7

“Former Polish PM Refuses To Sign Lustration Document” RFE/RL Newsline April 26 2007 Accessed at:
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076122.html; “Poland: Tough Lustration Law Divides Society”
RFE/RL Reports March 23 2007 Accessed at: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1075471.html; Traynor,
Ian “Polish prime Minister Gambles on Snap Poll” The Guardian September 8 2007 Accessed at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/sep/08/iantraynor.international ; Michnik, Adam. “The Other
Poland” May 10 2007 The Guardian Accessed at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/may/10/theotherpoland; Ash, Timothy Garton. “Poland
has made a humiliating farce out of dealing with its red ghosts” May 24 2007 The Guardian Accessed at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/may/24/comment.comment
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found that nearly 60% of respondents believed that they had been better off during the
communist era (Nedelsky 2004). The public, along with elites, were disinterested in lustration. In
2001 the journal Kritika & Kontext published a special issue about the lack of public discourse
about the former secret police. Nedelsky quotes Mirosal Kusy, a Slovak social scientist and
Charter 77 signatory as saying that “not only was the general public uninterested, in the StB, but
there was also insufficient interest of the expert community, historians, political scientists,
opinion makers” (Nedelsky 2009) Given the lack of interest by the public and opinion makers, it
is reasonable not to expect to have a high degree of civil society mobilization on this issue.

Civic Organizations Moving Into Government
The civic umbrella organizations that developed in Poland, and Czechoslovakia did so as
a form of opposition to the communist regimes. When these regimes fell, these civic groups
came into power as the new governments, and soon began to fracture and to form into political
parties. This had important consequences for lustration policies. By definition, once former
dissidents came into power in governments, they were no longer part of the civil society. As
these organizations became parties, they too left the realm of civil society, even granting that the
lines between parties and movements can be blurred in the aftermath of the transitions in these
countries. The movement of personal, talent and organizational ability inevitably weakened civil
society in the immediate aftermath of the transitions (Arato 1992).
In Poland the communist party and its allies lost all contested seats in 1989 semi-free
elections to Solidarity, organized under the name Citizens Committee, and former dissident
Tadeusz Mazowiecki became prime minister after the communists were unable to form a
government (Arato 1992). The first free parliamentary elections produced the formation of a
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center-right coalition of post-Solidarity parties with an anti-communist agenda which included
lustration policies, as well as a desire for revenge against the left wing of Solidarity that had
excluded them from power (Osiatynski 1994, Rupnik 1995). In Poland ideological differences in
part over the nature of how to deal with the past led to a split in Solidarity, as the left-wing of the
party that came into power with Mazowiecki began to exclude the right wing. This led the more
radical decommunizers to support Lech Wałęsa in his bid for president against Mazowiecki,
which he won in December of 1990.
Václav Havel, leader of the Civic Forum civil group in Czechoslovakia, became
president at the end of December 1989 and in the founding elections in 1990, Civic Forum and
PAV won a little more than forty-five percent of the sets in the Chamber of Nations forming a
coalition with other opposition groups.8 In January 1991, Civic Forum chairman Václav Klaus
announced that Civic Forum would split into two parties, while in Slovakia the PAV under
Vladimír Mečiar also split into two parties.9 While most of the parties in the June 1990 elections
screened their candidates, the debates over vetting began with the early 1991 recommendations
of the parliamentary commission investigating the November 1989 crackdown that sparked the
revolution in Czechoslovakia. The lustration law was passed in October of 1991.
Czechoslovakian President Václav Havel was personally opposed to the bill but chose not to
oppose it, feeling it necessary for the country, while Civic Forum leader Václav Klaus was a
proponent (Michnik and Havel 1993, Nedelsky 2009). Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar
opposed the screening bill, and it was never implemented in the Slovak region or in Slovakia
following the velvet divorce.
8

Inter-Parlimentary Union. Czechoslavakia: Parliamentary Chamber: Chamber of Nations 1990. Accessed at:
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2084_90.htm August 21, 2009
9

“Impact of OF’s Transformation Viewed,” FBIS Eastern Europe Daily Report, 24 January 1991, pp. 27-28
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Hungary had not one but several groups which opposed the regime. The college youth
had organized into FIDESZ, while the intellectuals had formed the Hungarian Democratic Forum
(MDF), while other opposition groups formed the Network of Free Initiatives, which would
evolve into the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). The founding elections in March 1990
produced an MDF-led center-right coalition under Prime Minister József Antall. The initial
attempt to pass a lustration law in 1991 was opposed by Prime Minster Antall, and the ruling
coalition, despite sharing an interest in keeping the communists out of power, were unable to
overcome their differences and adopt lustration legislation until 1994 (Stan 2007a).
Political Competition
Even the 1991 lustration law in Czechoslovakia, while swiftly executed and popular with
in the Czech region of the country, produced a significant amount of competition between the
Civil Democratic Party (ODS), a center-right liberal party and Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia (HZDS) a nationalist party comprised mostly of former Communists with a leftist
economic agenda. The 1991 law passed the Chamber of Deputies with all of the ODS Deputies
voting for the bill and all of the HZDS deputies voting against it, which Nedelsky (2009) argues
signified a major schism between left and right, as well as Czechs and Slovaks. With the 1992
elections in which the two parties won control in their respective regional elections, lustration
once again became a contentious issue. The new Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar had
previously served as Prime Minister and been dismissed among allegations that he had used his
access to files as Interior Minister for political advantage, as well as destroying others, in
addition to sacking the then Interior Minister for dismissing former StB agents employed by
Meciar (Nedelsky 2009). The negotiations that took place over the nature of the Czech
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Federation in July 1992 broke down in part over a series of demands by the HZDS that included
a repeal of the 1991 lustration law.
The aborted Polish lustration in 1992 is a clear example of the politicization of the past.
The Olszewski government, dominated by anti-communists, produced a list of people whose
names had appeared in the secret police files, including former Solidarity leader and thenpresident President Lech Wałęsa. The lists were widely regarded as a politically motivated
attempt by the troubled government and led to its collapse due to a vote of no confidence soon
after the list was released (Osiatynski 1994). The return of the ex-communists to Polish politics
in the form of the SLD in 1993 and the election of former communist official Aleksander
Kwasniewski to the presidency in 1995 continued a pattern of lustration polices as party
competition. Despite being the first ECE country to transition away from communism, there
were no serious attempts to pass lustration legislation after the 1992 debacle until the 1996
“Olesky affair.” Prime Minister Józef Olesky of the SLD was accused by outgoing president
Wałęsa of having been a spy for the Soviets and later Russians. The resulting scandal caused
Olesky to resign as prime minister and brought the issue of lustration to the forefront in 1996
(Szczerbiak 2002).10 In response, President Kwasniewski proposed a modest lustration law
which Stan (2009b) argues was an attempt to insulate the SLD and to control the screening
process. A pro-lustration coalition emerged between post-Solidarity parties and the SLD’s
coalition ally, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) which favored a broader lustration bill and rejected
the SLD’s attempts to narrow the bill. President Kwasniewski, likely in view of the upcoming
10

“Polish Prime Minister Accused of Treason” RFE/RL Newsline December 20 1995 Accessed at:
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1141073.html; “Polish Prime Minister Rejects Collaboration” RFE/RL
Newsline December 21 1995 Accessed at: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1141074.html
“While Gazeta Wyborcza Publishes Details” RFE/RL Newsline December 21 1995 Accessed at:
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1141074.html; ”Polish Prime Minister on Spy Allegations” RFE/RL Newsline
January 23 1996 Accessed at: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1141093.html; “Polish Deputy Premier Resigns
Over Lustration” RFE/RL Newsline September 3 1999 Accessed at:
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1141984.html.
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elections, chose not to veto the bill. A center-right coalition government, including parties and
individuals who had been in the 1992 Olszewski government, came into power in 1997, and the
next year the lustration law was amended to widen the scope of the screenings and improve their
efficiency (Szczerbiak 2002; Stan 2009b). The 2001 elections returned the SLD to power, and
later that year the Sejm voted to soften the lustration law, although these amendments were
overturned by the Constitutional Court (Stan 2009b).11 In the 2005 elections, the right-wing Law
and Justice Party formed a minority government, and Lech Kaczyński, a radical anti-communist,
became the new President. In 2006 the Sejm passed a new lustration and decommunization law
that substantially expanded the scope of the screenings to nearly 700,000 people, which Garton
Ash (2007) claims is directed both at the post-Solidarity left wing who perceived as
compromising with the communistys as well as the ex-communists.
The first attempt at a lustration and file access law in Hungary failed to gain support,
partially because of a perception that the parties of the MDF coalition planned to use the law
against their political opponents, and Prime Minister Antall was rumored to have passed out lists
of deputies that could be exposed if the new law were enacted (Stan 2009a). As in Poland, the
regeneration of the ex-communists encouraged the use of lustration as a political weapon by
right-wing parties against the left-wing parties, and left-wing parties attempted to limit those
policies. Hungary passed its first lustration law in March 1994, shortly before the May elections
which brought the ex-communist MSzP-led coalition into power. The new parliament asked the
Constitutional Court to review the December 1994 law, and the Court found several provisions
unconstitutional. The parliament in 1996 then amended the law to narrow the scope of the

11

“President Signs Amended Lustration Law” RFE/RL (Un)Civil Societies Report October 23 2002 Accessed at:
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1347286.html; “Amendments to Lustration Law Ruled Unconstitutional”
RFE/RL (Un)Civil Societies Report July 26 2002 Accessed at: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1347269.html
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mandatory screenings and have it expire in 2000 (Ellis 1996, Stan 2009a). The admission of
Prime Minister Guyla Horn that he had received secret reports as Exterior Minister and his
refusal to resign or apologize contributed to the a right-wing electoral victory in the
parliamentary elections of 1998, with FIDESZ and the Smallholder’s Party forming a coalition.
In 2000, the parliament broadened the mandatory lustrations to journalists and leaders of political
parties receiving funds and extended the mandatory vetting until 2004. The MSzP and the
SZDSZ coalition returned to power in the 2002 elections. A scandal erupted when MSzP Prime
Minister Medgyessy was accused of having been a collaborator, which nearly brought down the
government. Shortly thereafter, both the government and the opposition proposed conflicting sets
of amendments to the lustration law, with the government-sponsored milder amendments
passing.
In both the Hungarian and Polish cases, politicians appear to have been more concerned
with strategic considerations than public demand. Lustration and file access in Hungary were not
major considerations of the public according to opinion polls, even during the Medgyessy
scandal. In fact, his popularity rose, and previous Prime Minister Guyla Horn had admitted his
participation as an informant during the 1956 uprising, provoking ire only with the revelations
that he had received reports about the opposition during his time as foreign minister.12 As Stan
(2009b) argues, the Hungarian people seemed to have extended the communist-era belief that
living well is the best revenge into the post-transition. In Poland, lustration has consistently had
considerable amount of public support, not dropping below 50% from 1994 until 1999
(Szczerbiak 2002). Yet, because of the 1992 debacle no lustration law was seriously considered
until the wake of the Olesky affair in 1996. Both of these examples seem to confirm that actors
12

“While Poll Shows Public Does Not Care” RFE/RL Newsline 12 August 2002. Available at:
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1142735.html
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dealing with these policies are more concerned with political considerations than a demand from
the public.
Conclusion
The lack of literature on the interplay between civil society and lustration illustrates the
need for further attention to this topic. The most immediate avenue to pursue would be field
research; especially an analysis of the involvement of media, the one area where there was
significant civil society involvement in lustration debates. Additionally, while the three factors
outlined prior, the legacies of the past regimes, the movement of civil society into government,
and the use of lustration laws are the three most salient factors for the lack of involvement in the
lustration debates in all four the states in this study. Other factors may also play a role in the
individual states, such as the focus on economic concerns by the trade unions in Poland, or the
backslide into authoritarianism in Slovakia under the Mečiar regime.

20

References
Appel, Hillary. 2005. “Anti-Communist Justice and Founding the Post-Communist Order:
Lustration and Restitution in Central Europe.” East European Politics & Societies 19(3):
379-405.
Arato, Andrew. 1992. “Civil Society in Emerging Democracies: Poland and Hungary.” in From
Leninism to Freedom: The Challenges of Democratization. ed. Margaret Latus Nugent.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Backer, David. 2003. Civil Society and Transitional Justice: Possibilities, Patterns and
Prospects.” Journal of Human Rights 2(3): 297-313.
Barnes, Samuel H. 2006. “The Changing Political Participation of Postcommunist Citizens.”
International Journal of Sociology 36(2):76-98.
Baxter, Victoria. 2005. “Civil Society Promotion of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Chile:
Villa Grimaldi.” Peace and Change 30(1): 120-136.
Bernhard, Michael H. and Karakoç, Ekrem. 2007. “Civil Society and the Legacies of
Dictatorship.” World Politics 59(4): 539-567.
Bozóki, András and Gergely Karacsony. 2002. “The Making of a Political Elite: Participants in
the Hungarian Roundtable Talks of 1989.” in The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis
of Hungarian Democracy: Analysis and Documents. Budapest: Central European
University Press.
Colvin, Christopher J. 2007. “Civil Society and Reconciliation in Southern Africa.” Development
in Practice 17(3): 322-337.
Crocker, David A. 1999. “Civil Society and Transitional Justice.” in Civil Society, Democracy,
and Civic Renewal, ed. Robert K Fullinwider. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers.
Diamond, Larry Jay. 1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore,
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.
David, Roman. 2003. “Lustration Laws in Action: The Motives and Evaluation of Lustration
Policy in the Czech Republic and Poland (1989–2001).” Law and Social Inquiry 28(2):
327-440.
Ekiert, Grzegorz and Jan Kubik. 1998. “Contentious Politics in New Democracies: East
Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989- 93.” World Politics 50(4): 547-581.

21

Elster, John. 1996. The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Garton Ash, Timothy. 2007. “Poland Has Made a Humiliating Farce Out of Dealing with its Red
Ghosts” The Guardian, 24 May 2007. Accessed online: 20 August 2009
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/may/24/comment.comment
Grodsky, Brian 2007a. “Looking for Solidarność in Central Asia: The Role of Human Rights
Organizations in Political Change.” Slavic Review 66(3): 442-462.
Grodsky, Brian 2007b. “Producing Truth: The Politics of Investigating Past Human Rights
Violations in Post-Communist States.” World Affairs 169(3):125-133.
Grodsky, Brian. 2008. “Weighing the Costs of Accountability: The Role of Institutional
Incentives in Pursuing Transitional Justice.” Journal of Human Rights 7(4): 353-375.
Grzymała-Busse, Anna. 2002. Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist
Successor Parties in East Central Europe After 1989. New York: Cambridge University
Press
Hayner, Pricilla B. 2002. Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions.
New York: Routledge
Howard, Marc Morjé. 2003. The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
Huyse, Luc. 1995. “Justice After Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing
With the Past.” Law and Social Inquiry 20(1): 51-78.
Kaminski, Marek, and Monika Napela. 2008. “Suffer a Scratch to Avoid a Blow? Why Postcommunist Parties in Eastern Europe Introduce Lustration.”
Kennedy, Micheal D. 2002. Cultural Formations of Postcommunism: Emancipation, Transition,
Nation, and War. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Kopecky, Petr and Edward Barnfield. 1999. “Charting the Decline of Civil Society.” in
Democracy without Borders: Transnationalization and Conditionality in New
Democracies, ed. Jean Grugel. New York: Routledge.
Letki, Natalia. 2002. “Lustration and Democratisation in East-Central Europe.” Europe-Asia
Studies 54(4): 529-552.
Letki, Natalia. 2004. “Socialization for Participation? Trust, Membership, and Democratization
in East-Central Europe.” Political Research Quarterly, 57(4): 665-679

22

McFaul, Michael. 2002. “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative
Transitions in the Postcommunist Word.” World Politics 54(2): 212-244.
McFaul, Michael. 2005. “Transitions from Postcommunism.” Journal of Democracy (16)3: 5-19
Michnik, Adam, and Václav Havel. 1993. “Justice or Revenge?” Journal of Democracy (4)1: 2027
Nedelsky, Nadya. 2004. “Divergent Responses to a Common Past: Transitional Justice in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia.” Theory and Society 33(1): 65-115.
Nedelsky, Nadya. 2009. “Czechoslovakia, and the Czech and Slovak Republics.” in Transitional
justice in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, ed Lavinia Stan. London:
Routledge.
Osiatynski, Wiktor. 1992. “Agent Walesa?” East European Constitutional Review 1(3): 28-30.
Osiatynski, Wiktor. 1994. "Decommunization and Recommunization in Poland." East European
Constitutional Review 3(3-4): 36-41.
Putnam, Robert. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Rupnik, Jaques. 1995. “The Post-Totalitarian Blues.” trans. Deborah M. Brissman. Journal of
Democracy 6(2): 61-73
Schock, Kurt. 1999. “People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization
and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma.” Social Problems 46(3): 355-375
Stan, Lavinia. 2009a. “Hungary.” in Transitional justice in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, ed. Lavinia Stan. London: Routledge.
Stan, Lavinia. 2009b. “Poland.” in Transitional justice in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, ed Lavinia Stan. London: Routledge
Stan, Lavinia. 2009c. “Conclusion: Explaining Country Differences.” in Transitional justice in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, ed Lavinia Stan. London: Routledge
Szabo, Mate. 2007. “Some Lessons of Collective Protests in Central European Post-Communist
Countries: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and East Germany Between 1989-1993.” in
Transition in Central and Eastern European Countries: Experiences and Future
Perspectives, eds. Pero Maldini and Davorca Vidovic. Zagreb: Political Science Research
Centre.
Szczerbiak, Aleks. 2002. “Dealing with the Communist Past or the Politics of the Present?
Lustration in Post-Communist Poland.” Europe-Asia Studies 54(4):559-560.

23

Tocqueville, Alexis de, Harvey Claflin Mansfield, and Delba Winthrop. 2000. Democracy in
America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Welsh, Helga A. “Dealing with the Communist Past: Central and East European Experiences
after 1990.” Europe-Asia Studies 48(3): 413-428.
Williams, Kieran, Brigid Fowler, Aleks Szczerbiak. 2005. Explaining Lustration in Central
Europe: A ‘Post-communist Politics’ Approach.” Democratization 12(1): 22–43.

24

